| Global
Insight Perspective |
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| Significance |
In
a rare cabinet reshuffle, President Putin has promoted both Dmitry Medvedev, the
head of the presidential administration, and Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov to
the post of Deputy Prime Minister, joining current Deputy PM Alexander Zhukov. |
| Implications |
The
promotion of the two men will heighten speculation over who Putin will choose to
succeed him in 2008. It does, however, signal a return of decision-making to the
Cabinet rather than the presidential administration which had contributed to the
infighting within the cabinet over the past year. Moreover, it heralds the
gradual eclipse of Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. |
| Outlook |
Putin
will attempt to raise the public profile of Medvedev, who now appears to be the
frontrunner to take over the presidency in 2008. Putin will replace Fradkov with
his chosen successor in the future before the 2007 parliamentary elections,
although Fradkov is safe in his job for the time being. |
Putin Names 'Team 2008'
Having firmly made the stabilisation of
Russia's political and economic systems the overriding objective of his
presidency, President Putin, eager to give the outward appearance of continuity
within the Russian elite, has generally refrained from making many changes in
personnel within the Cabinet. Nevertheless, bound by Article 81 of the Russian
constitution which explicitly prohibits him from seeking a third consecutive
term in office, speculation over who will succeed Putin is gradually reaching
fever pitch and questions had begun to be asked over when the president would
begin the long process of grooming his chosen heir. Yesterday (14 November),
Putin gave the clearest indication yet as to who his preferred successor to take
over the presidency when his term expires in 2008 will be. At the weekly
televised Cabinet meeting, he announced a number of changes to the Cabinet in
addition to confirming the establishment of the council for national projects,
which will implement and oversee spending on health, education and social
projects totalling some US$4 billion.
Moreover, Putin installed Dmitry Medvedev, the
powerful head of the presidential administration and chairman of the board of
Gazprom, the state-owned gas vehicle as a deputy prime minister. Defence
Minister Sergei Ivanov, another close ally, was also appointed to the additional
post of deputy prime minister joining existing Deputy Prime Minister Alexander
Zhukov to re-establish a three-pronged deputy prime ministerial office which had
been abolished in the previous reshuffle in March 2004. While Ivanov will keep
his responsibilities as Defence Minister, Medvedev was replaced as Kremlin chief
of staff by Sergei Sobyanin, governor of the oil-rich Tyumen region in Western
Siberia and Putin loyalist. Putin also removed two of his longest serving
federal envoys, former Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko in the Volga district,
who was replaced by Alexander Konovalov, a former prosecutor in Bashkortostan
and Konstantin Pulikovsky, the Far East federal envoy, who was replaced with the
Mayor of Kazan, Kamil Ishkakov.
Putin stressed that the primary reason for the
personnel changes was due to a 'lack of coordination among ministries and
agencies' adding that Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov had personally proposed
Sergei Ivanov as a deputy prime minister. Indeed, Putin's frustrations with the
constant infighting within the Cabinet has become only too evident over the past
year, hampering the government's structural and economic reforms (see Russia:
22 April 2005: Russian
Cabinet Infighting Speculation Persists, Doubts Raised over Energy Companies'
Merger Plan).
Outlook and Implications
Throughout the year, Putin has continually
declared his intention to abide by the terms of Article 81 and stand down in
2008. Nevertheless, given the stability that he has appeared to bring to Russia,
there was an influential school of thought which believed that he would seek to
amend the Constitution and either extend his current term in office or serve
another. The latest reshuffle effectively extinguishes any residual hopes or
fears that Putin would aim to stay in office past 2008. The decision to promote
Medvedev and Ivanov essentially marks the beginning of the 2008 presidential
election campaign.
Ivanov: The isolated siloviki
Of the two figures, Sergei Ivanov currently has
the higher public profile, both domestically and in the international arena.
Along with Boris Gryzlov, the leader of United Russia, the ruling
pro-presidential party and Sergei Mironov, speaker of the Federation Council
(upper house of parliament), Ivanov has long been regarded as a potential
successor to Putin. He remains a key confident of the Russian president, having
served with Putin in their KGB days and is regarded as one of the primary siloviki
(power people) within government. The stereotypical siloviki served
in either the law-enforcement, security or intelligence agencies during Soviet
rule and 'missed the boat' in the grab for power and money during the early
1990s. Nevertheless, while not a unified group with a specific set of aims and
aspirations, they generally desire a return to strong, centralised state control
in a number of key areas and Putin has generally given them free rein over a
number of ministries, including defence and the interior ministry.
Having allowed Ivanov to keep the defence
ministry in addition to becoming a deputy prime minister, Ivanov will take the
responsibility for Russia's defence industrial-military complex, taking charge
of the consolidation of the aircraft industry (see Russia: 8 November 2005: President
Urges Consolidation of Russian Defence Industry, Aircraft Manufacturer Mulls
London Listing). There is a clear need to strengthen the coordination
between the armed forces, the intelligence service, the Federal Security Service
(FSB), and law enforcement agencies as well as accelerating the necessary
reforms which will transform the armed forces to a modern professional army.
Nevertheless, while Ivanov appears to enjoy the confidence of President Putin,
the same cannot be said of his fellow peers. Ivanov remains highly unpopular
within the presidential administration and among regional elites. More
importantly, Ivanov is disliked within the military, which has hindered his
efforts to push through his promised sweeping military reforms (see Russia:
16 June 2005: Pressure
Continues On Defence Minister Over Number of Non-Combative Deaths in Army).
Medvedev: Putin Mark II Moves into the
Public Arena
The most likely candidate to replace Putin as
president in 2008 is Dmitry Medvedev. In many ways Medvedev is the perfect
continuity candidate. He is both an able policymaker and capable administrator,
having overseen increased state control of Gazprom and the transformation of the
company into a global force and a vehicle for Russian foreign policy. With the
possible exception of Dmitry Kozak, Putin's personal representative in the
troubled North Caucasus region, Medvedev appears to be the closest ideologically
to Putin; regarded as a centrist, balancing the interests of the economic
liberals within the Cabinet and the siloviki, Medvedev, like Putin is a
lawyer from St Petersburg and a firm believer in Putin's administrative and
legal reform agenda, which has increasingly stalled during his second term.
By elevating Medvedev from the presidential
administration (where he wielded considerable power) to the Cabinet, Putin has
returned the decision-making process to the government. Since the dismissal of
Mikhail Kasyanov as prime minister in March 2004, the balance of power had moved
from the White House (parliament) to the Kremlin. The move is effectively a
reconfiguration of power structures; the policy generating centre will now move
to the Cabinet, which will aid the long-term stability of the political system.
There has always been an influential school of
thought that being a frontrunner is political suicide and that the 'real'
candidate will emerge a few months before the election as happened with
President Putin in 1999. Indeed, there remains a host of possible scenarios
leading up to 2008 and in many ways the final candidate could be determined by
external events. If the country remains stable and oil prices continue to stay
at their elevated levels, then Putin will be tempted to promote Medvedev, who
will continue Putin's general liberal economic and legal reforms, in the current
political system. Any significant deterioration of the economy could accelerate
Russia's 'turn to the left' leading to a scenario where Putin will feel
compelled to elevate Ivanov, possibly counter-balanced by an economic reformer
such as Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin as prime minister.
However, Putin's 'grand strategy' will not
become clear until after the parliamentary elections in 2007. Nevertheless, it
now appears that Mikhail Fradkov is living on borrowed time. Having been
weakened by his inability to curb the Cabinet infighting and deliver the
promised reforms, he will remain as a figurehead prime minister until such a
time as Putin chooses to elevate his chosen successor to the post before the
2008 presidential election campaign.
In the meantime, Putin will attempt to lift the
public profile of Medvedev, by allowing him to head the presidium for the
council of national projects, the body which also includes Gryzlov, Economy
Minister German Gref, Kudrin and Alexei Miller, chief executive of Gazprom. The
fact that Fradkov has not been included in either the presidium or the 40-member
council highlights his gradual eclipse.
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